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In the Supretne Court of the 
State of Utah 
HARRY CHILD, also known as 
HENRY CHILD, 
Respondent, 
-vs-
EUGENE A. CHILD and 
ARVILLA CHILD, his wife, 
Appella.nts. 
Case No. 8869 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent calls attention to the fact that markings 
have been made in many places throughout the transcript 
of the trial, and asks that no unusual weight be ascribed 
by the Court to the passages so marked. They are not 
respondent's markings. 
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Because appellants have set forth many conflicts in 
the evidence in their statement of facts, respondent con-
siders it desirable to set forth the facts found to be true 
by the trial court. 
Respondent commenced this action July 18, 1956, 
to compel reconveyance to him of certain real property 
near Bountiful, Utah, referred to in the findings as 
((property A," consisting of 19.26 acres. Trial was had in 
the District Court of the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, 
J., sitting without jury, on June 14, 1957. The trial court 
found the issues for the respondent on his second cause of 
action and entered judgment thereupon on March 4, 1958. 
Appellant Eugene A. Child is a son of the respondent 
and Hazel Marie Child, who was the wife of respondent 
until divorced in December, 1955. Until the divorce, 
respondent owned and resided upon approximately nine 
acres of farm land near Bountiful, Utah, known in the 
Findings as uproperty B." Property uA" is near property 
uB," is higher in elevation, and is accurately described in 
the Findings. 
Respondent became interested in buying property 
uA" for his use in storing water and grazing livestock, and 
in approximately 1941 he searched out the owner and 
after investigating the value of the tract negotiated for 
its purchase through R. 0. Warnock of Salt Lake City 
(Tr. 6, 7, 8, 9). His offer of $15.00 per acre was rejected 
by Mrs. Griffiths, the owner at the time. 
Early in 1945 respondent learned of the death of Mrs. 
Griffiths and again contacted Mr. Warnock in an effort 
to purchase property uA" (Tr. 9), at which time Mr. 
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Warnock, acting for lone Griffiths Rankin, the succeeding 
owner, offered to sell property ccA" to respondent for 
$300.00 because of his prior interest therein (Tr. 11). 
Respondent immediately, on this occasion, accepted the 
offer and made a down-payment of $25.00 to Mr. War-
nock, the balance of the purchase price in the amount 
of $275.00 to be paid to Mr. Warnock upon delivery of 
the deed from lone Rankin in California conveying title 
to respondent (Tr. 11). 
Immediately thereafter respondent applied to the 
Bountiful State Bank for a loan of $275.00 to pay the 
balance due on the property. The bank approved the loan 
on condition that respondent deposit his water stock as 
security therefor (Tr. 12). 
Respondent's water stock was at the time in the bank 
safety deposit box of his wife, Hazel Child, who, with full 
knowledge of respondent's intended use of the water stock 
and the proceeds of the anticipated loan from the bank, 
refused to surrender the water stock to respondent upon 
his request therefor (Tr. 12, 13) in order to force him to 
sell cows to get the money (Tr. 70). The evidence indi-
cates that Hazel Child objected to respondent's efforts 
to build up a dairy herd (Tr. 24, 47-48, 69, 70, 75, 77, 
79) . There was also evidence that she tried a number of 
times to sell respondent's cows (Tr. 74). Hazel's re-
sponse to respondent's request for the water stock was, 
((Sell some of your cows" (Tr. 13, 24, 40). 
Hazel testified that the sale of two cows would have 
brought enough to pay the balance of $275.00 due on 
property uA" (Tr. 40), but she also admitted that at 
about that same time (while Eugene was away in the 
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service) she had sold one of tespondent's cows for $25.00 
(Tr. 59, 80). Respondent testified that he had only 5 or 
6 cows and none that he wanted to sell (Tr. 13, 24), and 
that two cows would not have brought enough money 
(Tr. 24). 
Being thus obstructed by Hazel Chad from obtaining 
a loan from the bank, respondent requested of Hazel a 
loan of $275.00 from a joint bank savings account held 
in the names Hazel Child and Eugene Child (Tr. 13). 
Hazel wrote to Eugene, who was then eighteen years of 
age (Tr. 20, 89) and stationed away from Utah in the 
Navy, for his permission to grant respondent the loan. In 
time, Hazel received a reply from Eugene and informed 
respondent that Eugene would grant the loan on condition 
that title to property uA" be placed in his name to secure 
the loan (Tr. 23, 24). 
Respondent did not receive, see, or read Eugene's 
reply to Hazel (Tr. 14, 23), but relied solely upon the 
representations of Hazel as to its contents. 
On or about April 16, 1945, Hazel withdrew money 
from the joint bank savings account of Hazel and Eugene 
Child in Bountiful and drove with respondent to Salt 
Lake City, where she delivered $275.00 (Tr. 14) to re-
spondent only after he got out of the car and after first 
exacting an express promise from him that he would put 
title to property uA" in the name of Eugene Child to 
secure Eugene the repayment of the loan (Tr. 15). 
This $275.00 was intended and received by respondent 
(Tr. 25, 108), and delivered by Hazel for Eugene, as a 
loan (Finding No. 15). This $275.00 was the only money 
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paid to respondent by Hazel or Eugene in connection with 
this loan (Tr. 107), and respondent did not receive from 
Hazel or Eugene any reimbursement of his $25.00 down 
payment (Tr. 55). 
After receiving the $275.00 from Hazel, respondent 
went alone to the office of Mr. Warnock in the Kearns 
Building in Salt Lake City and gave him the $275.00 in 
return for a deed conveying title to property HA" from 
lone Griffiths Rankin to respondent (Tr. 16). This 
deed is in evidence, and is dated April 10, 1945, reciting 
$300.00 as consideration. 
Property teA" was purchased by respondent for his 
sole benefit (Tr. 108, Finding No. 19). 
During this time, Eugene had no knowledge of the 
availability of property teA" nor of its location or value 
(Tr. 97). Eugene did not purchase nor negotiate for 
the purchase of this property (Tr. 81). 
After he purchased the property, respondent went 
with Hazel Child to the office of Toronto Real Estate Co. 
in Salt Lake City on April 16, 1945, and there executed a 
deed placing title to property HA" in Eugene's name in 
fulfillment of his promise (Tr. 17). Respondent exe-
cuted this deed for the sole purpose of securing Eugene's 
loan to him and for no other consideration, and no money 
was paid to respondent for this deed (Tr. 18, Finding No. 
21). Respondent ·Conveyed title to Eugene as security 
for the loan, and intended that Eugene hold title for re-
spondent in trust, to be reconveyed upon payment of the 
loan (Finding No. 22) . 
Respondent retained both deeds, and recorded them 
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in the office of the Davis County Recorder on June 6, 
1945. 
Ever since he purchased property nA," and through 
the date this action was :filed, respondent has enjoyed un-
interrupted possession and use of property ccA" (Tr. 21, 
100, 101). 
From the time he purchased it and ever since, re-
spondent has at all times unequivocally claimed owner-
ship of property nA" (Tr. 22, 31, 42, 82, 99), has at no 
time agreed or intended that Eugene have the beneficial 
ownership thereto (Tr. 31, 108), and has at all times denied 
appellants' claim of ownership (Tr. 31, 42, 82}. 
After he bought property uA," respondent procured 
and paid for a land survey thereof (Tr. 18} and an ab-
stract of title thereon (Tr. 20, 21, 96}. At his sole ex-
pense (Tr. 20, 93, 94) in an amount exceeding $200.00 
(Tr. 116) and virtually his sole effort (Tr. 20, 93), 
respondent constructed for his sole benefit a substantial 
fence enclosing property nA" (Tr. 18, 19}. From the 
date of his purchase until the filing of this action re-
spondent continuously and uninterruptedly pastured live-
stock on the property (Tr. 21) . 
Respondent paid taxes on the property for 1945 and 
1946 (Tr. 20, 26), and Eugene paid the taxes thereon from 
1947 to 1956 in the total amount of $172.41. 
Appellants have at no time objected to the re-
spondent's use, occupation, and enjoyment of property 
nA" though this use, occupation, and enjoyment have been 
open and known to appellants (Tr. 84). 
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After the return of Eugene from the service in 1946, 
respondent requested reconveyance to him of title to the 
property (Tr. 21, 82, 99) upon repayment of the loan 
(Tr. 25, 113), but Eugene refused to reconvey or to dis-
cuss the matter (Tr. 22, 25, 27, 30, 35), and has persisted 
in his refusal to discuss the matter with respondent (Tr. 
22) . Respondent has tendered repayment of the loan 
with interest and demanded reconveyance from Eugene, 
but the tender was refused and Eugene refused to re-
convey the property. 
Without respondent's permission and over his express 
objections, Eugene removed soil from both property ((A" 
and property .. B" (Tr. 33, 101, 113). His profit from 
the soil from property ''A" was $600.00. Prior to the 
filing of this action and without the knowledge or consent 
of respondent, appellants encumbered property ''A" with 
two mortgages. 
In order to avoid conflict and division within his 
family and to encourage unity therein, respondent in the 
hope and with the expectation of persuading appellants 
to reconvey property ''A" to him delayed bringing an 
action at law to compel reconveyance (Tr. 35). 
Respondent initiated this action to protect his rights 
and compel reconveyance following the divorce action 
by Hazel Child and in order to prevent the sale or dis-
posal of property ''A" and because of the interference by 
Eugene Child with respondent's possession and enjoyment 
of said property by destruction of respondent's fence. 
Shortly before this suit, the property became subject to 
condemnation proceedings (Tr. 96). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
A. FINDING NUMBER 12 IS FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
B. THE LOWER COURT MADE NO SUCH FIND-
INGS OR CONCLUSIONS AS THOSE STATED 
IN POINTS ONE AND TWO OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS FULLY SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT BELOW. 
POINT III 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE LOAN WAS $275.00 FIND AM-
PLE SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TI-IAT THERE WAS 
A BREACH OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HAZEL AND EU-
GENE CHILD ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES AND ARE 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT V 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 6 AND NO. 7 
ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT VI 
RESPONDENT'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR BY 
LACHES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. FINDING NUMBER 12 IS FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
B. THE LOWER COURT MADE NO SUCH FIND-
INGS OR CONCLUSIONS AS THOSE STATED 
IN POINTS ONE AND TWO OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF. 
A. 
Finding No. 12 that respondent was informed by 
Hazel Child that Eugene Child agreed to grant plaintiff a 
loan on condition that title to the property in question be 
placed in the name of Eugene Child to secure the loan 
finds ample support in the evidence during the cross-
examination of respondent by appellants' attorney, Tr. 
23: 
((Q. Did Mrs. Child ever tell you what was in the 
letter? 
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A. I don't recall her telling me what was in the 
letter other than that Eugene would loan me 
the money on the condition that I put the 
property in his name to secure the loan. That 
was my understanding of what was in the 
letter." 
Also, Tr. 24 (bottom of page): 
u ••• She told me she would let me have that 
money if I would put it in Eugene's name to secure 
the loan so Eugene would be sure to get his money 
back." 
This testimony IS plainly a sufficient basis for Finding 
No. 12. 
B. 
In their points one and two, and the argument in 
support thereof, appellants complain of a finding that 
Eugene Child agreed to grant a loan, findings that the 
deed was an equitable mortgage, and a conclusion of law 
entered upon these findings. The respondent respect-
fully points out that the record does not contain the 
findings and conclusion mentioned by appellants in their 
points one and two. 
Appellants do not refer by number to the findings 
and conclusion to which they object, except for a refer-
ence on page 33 of their brief to Finding No. 12. The 
record, p. 27, reveals that Finding No. 12 states that, 
u ••• Hazel Marie Child ... informed the plaintiff that ... 
Eugene A. Child expressed a willingness to grant plaintiff 
the loan upon the condition that the title to the property 
... be placed in the name of Eugene A. Child to secure 
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the loan." (Emphasis added.) This is, of course, a differ-
ent finding from that mentioned by appellants in their 
point one. 
It would appear that appellants, in points one and 
two, have set themselves up ustraw men" and then pro-
ceeded to demolish them in their argument. 
The burden of a considerable part of the argument 
of appellants under their points 1 and 2 is that the trial 
court found and concluded that the deed to property 
uA" executed by plaintiff to defendant Eugene A. Child 
is an equitable mortgage; that a deed can be given con-
struction as an equitable mortgage only on the basis of a 
finding of fact that both parties to the deed so intended 
it; and that there was insufficient or no competent evi-
dence adduced at the trial showing that defendant Eugene 
Child intended the deed to be a mortgage. The plaintiff 
takes issue with these arguments; but we here point out 
that this entire line of argument is fruitless and pointless 
in connection with the present appellate proceedings, in-
asmuch as there is no finding anywhere in the record, nor 
any conclusion of law, that the deed conveying title to 
property uA" constitutes an equitable mortgage. The 
Court will notice that plaintiff's theory of equitable mort-
gage was pleaded under the first cause of action of his 
complaint, but that the trial court, by minute entry (R. 
12), expressly found the issues in favor of the plaintiff 
under his second cause of action and issued judgment 
thereupon. 
We therefore suggest that appellants' argument under 
their points 1 and 2 pertaining to equitable mortgages is 
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irrelevant and immaterial to the case before the Court, 
and should be disregarded. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS FULLY SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT BELOW. 
In their brief, appellants have much to say about the 
sufficiency of the evidence, and the respondent considers 
it desirable at this point to consider in a general way the 
evidence adduced at the trial, together with authorities, in 
answer to appellants. 
Appellants quote in their brief from N orthcrest, Inc., 
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., et al. (1952), 122 U. 268, 
248 P.2d 692, 698, and we feel the quotation would be 
more helpful to the Court if more fully given: 
uFor evidence to be clear and convincing it 
must be such that there is no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. 
Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P.2d 194. The evi-
dence so satisfied the mi11d of the trial court. His 
finding should not be disturbed unless we must say 
that no one could reasonably find the evidence to 
be clear and convincing . ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
A leading Utah case relative to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in ·Cases such as the present one is Stanley v. Stan-
ley (1939), 97 U. 520, 94 P.2d 465, 466, which states 
that, 
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ccThe scope of the review on appeal in equity 
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. (This 
court is authorized by the state Constitution to re-
view the findings of the trial courts in equity cases, 
but the findings of the trial courts on conflicting 
evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly 
appears that the court has misapplied proven facts 
or made findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.' Olivero v, Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 
313, 315." 
The Stanley case has been cited and followed in many 
cases, including Perry v. McConkie (1953), 1 U.2d 189, 
264 P.2d 852, and Haws v. Jensen (1949), 116 U. 212, 
209 P.2d 229, both of which are of interest relative to the 
present case. 
This Court recently said in a similar case, Toombs v. 
Toombs ( 1958), 7 U.2d 256, 322 P.2d 405, that, 
((The trial court having found in favor of re-
spondents and their being sufficient evidence to 
sustain such a finding and the evidence and cir-
cumstances not being such as to require a different 
finding, this court will not reverse." 
In their comments regarding the evidence, the ap-
pellants fail to recognize that the trial judge resolved con-
:flicting issues of fact in favor of the respondent and against 
appellants. 
In IX Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., sec. 2498, p. 
327, this eminent authority quotes the following: 
cc (There is no measure of the weight of evi-
dence ( unles the witnesses on the evidential facts 
are counted) other than the feeling of probability 
which it engenders.' " (Emphasis the author's.) 
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And on pp. 334, 335 of the same volume and section we 
find, 
((The application of the phrase (preponderance 
of evidence' is apt to lead the judicial discussion 
close to the danger line of the fallacious quantita-
tive or numerical theory of testimony. . . . Al-
though that theory has been generally repudiated 
in our law, yet there is often a lurking recurren~e 
to it in the statement that an uncontradicted wit-
ness must be believed, i.e. his testimony constitutes 
(per se' a preponderance. The unsoundness of this 
conception has already been noticed. . . . " 
In vol. VII of the same work, sec. 2033, p. 255, the author 
states, 
u ••• The probative value of a witness' asser-
tion is utterly incapable of being measure (sic) by 
arithmetic. All the considerations which operate 
to discredit testimony affect it in such varying ways 
for different witnesses that the net trustworthiness 
of each one's testimony is not to be estimated, either 
in itself or in reference to others' testimony, by any 
uniform numerical standard. Probative effects are 
too elusive and intangible for that. The personal 
element behind the assertion is the vital one, and is 
too multifarious to be measured by rule. (Testi-
mony,' as Boyle well said, tis like the shot of a long-
bow, which owes its efficacy to the force of the 
shooter; argument (i.e. circumstantial inference) 
is like the shot of a cross-bow, equally forcible 
whether discharged by a giant or a dwarf.' The 
cross-bow notion of testimony-the notion that 
one man's shot is as forceful as any other man's-
can find no defenders to-day." 
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And in vol. VII, sec. 2034, pp. 259 ff., Professor Wigmore 
writes, 
uThe common law, then, in repudiating the 
numerical system, lays down four general princi-
ples: 
(I) Credibility does not depend on num-
bers of witnesses. Therefore: 
( 2) In general, the testimony of a single 
witness, no matter what the issue or who the 
person, may legally suffice as evidence upon 
which the jury may found a verdict. 
(3) Conversely, the mere assertion of any 
witness does not of itself need to be believed, 
even though he is unimpeached in any man-
ner; because to require such belief would be 
to give a quantitative and impersonal measure 
to testimony .... " 
These authorities find particular application to the present 
case, wherein the trial judge was especially justified in dis-
counting the testimony of Hazel Child, the embittered 
former wife of respondent. 
In its consideration of this case, we invite the particu-
lar attention of the Court to the following facts: 
1. Respondent, not Eugene Child, initiated 
efforts to purchase the property in about 1941 and 
personally conducted negotiations and made his 
offer. 
2. Respondent alone, and not Eugene, con-
ducted all negotiations for the property, both in 
1941 and 1945. 
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3. Hazel Child's testimony that the transac-
tion was consummated through Mr. Toronto in 
his office and that she paid the $275.00 to Mr. 
Toronto on this occasion was completely impeached 
by the independent testimony of Mr. Warnock. 
4. Respondent took title to the property in 
his own name, and the deed conveying title to 
Eugene was only constructively delivered when 
respondent recorded it on June 6, 1945. 
5. Respondent immediately accepted th~ of-
fer of the property by Mr. Warnock, for re-
spondent himself, paying $25.00 down at the time 
and the balance on receipt of the deed. 
6. Respondent received the $275.00 from the 
hands of Hazel Child only after he got out of the 
car to go to Warnock's office, and then only after 
she had again exacted his express promise to deed 
the property to Eugene to secure the loan. 
7. The loan was made before respondent exe-
cuted the deed to Eugene Child, and no considera-
tion passed at the time respondent executed the 
deed as security nor thereafter. 
8. It is more than a little absurd to think that 
the respondent should try for a period of several 
years to purchase the property in question and, as 
soon as he was successful, immediately turn around 
and sell it for $25.00 less than he paid for it; or to 
think that he so diligently tried to purchase the 
property for another. 
9. It is not controverted that through all the 
years since he acquired the property, the attitude 
of the respondent toward it has remained constant 
and unswerving. He wanted the property and he 
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finally bought it. He has unfailingly and frequent-
ly claimed the property as his own, only to be re-
buffed or met with silence on the part of his son. 
At the time of the transaction, Eugene Child's 
agent, Hazel Child, knew full well that the re-
spondent considered the property his and gave the 
deed only to secure the loan. 
10. Eugene Child admitted in court that he 
had never investigated the value of real property 
anywhere at the time of the transaction, and had 
never purchased any real property. He was 18 
years old, away from home at the time, and did 
not even know the location of the property. Re-
spondent hardly need mention the strong im-
probability that appellant intended to ((invest" 
therin, or to purchase it sight-unseen. 
11. Respondent at the time did not have suf-
ficient money to purchase the property, a goal of 
long-standing interest. He acceded to the duress 
imposed upon him by his wife to execute a deed 
required as security for a loan which would allow 
him to reach his goal, and he did so in good faith 
and confidence in the members of his family. The 
duress on respondent was real, and was admitted by 
Hazel when she testified that she deliberately re-
fused to surrender to respondent his water stock. 
12. The evidence shows plainly that a sale of 
the property would have deprived respondent of 
his goal and was the last thing in his mind. The 
situation shows a loan, with an absolute deed ex-
acted under the duress of his financial situatiop. by 
persons he trusted. Let the Court judge the good 
faith of Hazel Child in this connection. 
13. As to appellant Eugene Child, the entire 
matter commenced in respondent's application for 
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a loan, and nothing else. Respondent made no 
offer at any time to sell the property, and appel-
lants do not even claim he did. Respondent cate-
gorically insists that only a loan was consummated; 
anything else would have defeated respondent's en-
tire purpose. 
14. Respondent has been in beneficial, open, 
and notorious possession of the property ever since 
he purchased it. He paid no rent of any kind. 
Appellants did not object to respondent's use of 
the land. Respondent, with his own labor and at 
his sole expense, made the only improvement upon 
the land. The only treatment of the property by 
appellant was to commit waste thereupon and also 
upon property t(B" over the express objections of 
respondent. 
IS. Respondent undeniably did not intend to 
convey the beneficial interest in the property to 
his son. 
16. Appellant Eugene Child did not negotiate 
for the land, did not know the owner's identity, and 
was never considered by the sellers as the purchaser 
of the land. 
17. It is highly significant that appellant Eu-
gene Child's only contact with the entire matter 
was his response to respondent's application for a 
loan. 
Contrary to contentions of appellants, it was made 
abundantly clear at the trial that respondent was never 
called upon at the time of the divorce action initiated by 
Hazel Child to list his property. Respondent asks appel-
lants to explain to this Court why respondent should vol-
unteer additional property at the time of the divorce in 
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order to share it with Hazel Child, through whose mala 
:fides respondent had parted with record title to said 
property. 
Hazel Child testified that Eugene told her before 
going into the Navy not to loan respondent any money for 
anything (Tr. 38). But independent testimony intro-
duced after the trial by stipulation (R. 21) shows that 
at the time Eugene is purported to have left this instruc-
tion relative to his bank account, he had a balance in said 
account of $8.45. Eugene left for the service in June, 
1944. It is doubtful that Eugene was this fearful about 
his $8.45 bank balance. This indicates again the general 
unreliability of Hazel Child's testimony in connection 
with matters involving her former husband. 
Appellants mention the testimony of Brandt Child 
relative to a letter. Brandt admitted during the trial that 
he had not read the letter he mentioned and had no knowl-
edge of its contents. He only guessed or .. assumed" that 
the date was April 16, 1945, and he admitted that he was 
17 years of age at the time. There is nothing in his testi-
mony connecting any letter he allegedly saw in the hand 
of the respondent with a letter from Eugene to Hazel 
Child concerning the property in question. Brandt's 
recollection that Hazel Child suggested that respondent 
sell his cows and buy the property with the proceeds does 
not have the significance suggested by the appellants. 
Rather, it only indicates again how obstinate was the fixa-
tion of his mother relative to those cows. Brandt admitted 
in his testimony (Tr. 72) that cows was a tt ••• very, or 
spoken, or mentioned thing," that his father and mother 
had frequent arguments about the cows, and that his 
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mother had tried on several occasions to sell the cows. 
In fact, the letter arrived authorizing the loan; but it was 
still up to Hazel to go to the bank and withdraw the 
money, and Hazel just seemingly could not rid her mind 
of respondent's cows. She satisfied her insistence upon 
dominance over her husband by requiring him to prom-
ise a deed absolute as security for the loan, or suggesting 
to Eugene that he require said deed as security. 
Appellants misrepresent the evidence beginning at the 
bottom of page 31 of their brief, referring to the cross-
examination of respondent. The respondent very clearly 
and plainly testified that he was unable to relate the men-
tion of selling cows by Hazel Child to the day on which 
he paid the balance on the property (Tr. 23, 24). Further, 
respondent testified that two cows would not have brought 
enough money to purchase the property at that time. After 
all, a rna jor reason respondent wanted the property was 
for pasture in his effort to build up a dairy herd, and the 
appellants find it difficult to understand why respondent 
did not wa~t to sell the very cows with which he was 
trying to build a dairy herd and for which he was buying 
the property. 
POINT III 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE LOAN WAS $275.00 FIND AM-
PLE SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. 
A. 
Appellants object, in their point 3, to the findings and 
conclusions that the amount of the loan to respondent 
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was $275.00 rather than $300.00. Appellants suggest 
that respondent adheres to the figure $275.00 because of 
remarks during the course of the trial by the trial judge. 
Unfortunately for this argument of appellants, it clearly 
appears from the transcript that respondent testified that 
he paid $25.00 down at the time he accepted Mr. War-
nock's offer of the property, that the purchase price of the 
property was $300.00, and that the balance due was 
$275.00 (Tr. 11). The remarks of the trial judge men-
tioned by appellants occurred during the cross-examina-
tion of Hazel Child (Tr. 55) an hour or more later, and 
after a recess (Tr. 32). 
Appellants admit in their brief, p. 3 5, that if re-
spondent received $275.00 of Eugene's money, this is 
some evidence that Eugene was lending him enough to 
enable him to pay the balance of the purchase price. 
Respondent testified that the balance he owed on the 
purchase price was $275.00 (Tr. 11) ; that he went to 
Bountiful State Bank to borrow the $275.00 (Tr. 12); 
that he asked his wife for his water stock so he could bor-
row $275.00 (Tr. 12); that he asked his wife for $275.00 
from the joint bank account (Tr. 13) ; that he eventually 
got the $275.00 from his wife (Tr. 14); and that he gave 
this $275.00 to M.r. Warnock for the deed to the property 
(Tr. 16). Respondent further, answering the trial judge, 
testified that he did not receive back his down payment 
of $25.00 (Tr. 55). Respondent submits that this is am-
ple evidence to support the findings and conclusions that 
the amount of the loan was $275.00. 
It is interesting to note that Hazel Child's testimony 
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that she paid this money to Mr. Toronto in Mr. Toronto's 
office, complete with an account of what was said at the 
time (Tr. 41, 42), was entirely and completely impeached 
by the independent testimony of Mr. Warnock. Appel-
lants remark that Hazel Child's testimony in this par-
ticular was uhazy." A careful perusal of Hazel Child's 
testimony shows that it was cchazy" much of the time ex-
cept when she thought something would be detrimental 
to respondent, at which times she made sure that her 
recollections were not uhazy" --even though imaginative. 
B. 
Appellants captiously object to the findings and con-
clusions that the amount of the loan was $275.00, rather 
than $300.00 as mentioned in the complaint. Counsel for 
appellants sufficiently brought out the reason for this 
himself upon his examination of respondent during the 
trial (Tr. 105), when the respondent freely admitted that 
at the time depositions were taken in October, 1956, ap-
proximately eight months prior to the trial, he did not 
remember whether he received $300.00 or $275.00 from 
Hazel Child. It is obvious that respondent was reminded 
of the $25.00 down payment he made when asked spe-
cifically (Tr. 11) whether or not anything was done to 
bind the deal when he accepted Mr. Warnock's offer to 
sell the property to respondent. It is clear, also, that this 
accords with the view of the trial judge. 
Appellants significantly make no claim nor attempt 
any showing that this variance between the complaint 
and the evidence has surprised or misled them in any way. 
As to this variance, in addition to the above, respondent 
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·relies upon the familiar rule that an immaterial variance, 
with no showing of prejudice to the appellants' case, is 
not reversible error. This rule is so ancient and well-
known that it needs no citation of authority. 
Further, respondent relies upon the equally familiar 
rule that an appellate court will not reverse where an ap-
pellant raises a question for the first time on appeal that 
should have been presented to the trial court, particularly 
in the absence of any showing of prejudice to the appel-
lant's case. Appellants should have objected below to the 
introduction of evidence showing the amount of the loan 
as $275.00 rather than $300.00, in order that respondent 
could move to amend the complaint to conform to the 
evidence. In fact, counsel for appellants elicited some 
of the evidence himself to which he now objects (Tr. 108). 
In addition, it is submitted that appellants should have 
submitted this matter to the trial court under Rule 52 
(b), U.R.C.P. Appellants failed to take these steps below, 
and their present objections come too late. 
POINT IV 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THERE WAS 
A BREACH OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HAZEL AND EU-
GENE CHILD ARE WITHIN THE ISSUES AND ARE 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants first complain that there is no allegation 
in the complaint of a confidential relationship. Appel-
lants, however, fail to allege or make any showing at all 
that they were surprised, misled, or prejudiced in any way 
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because confidential relationship of the parties was not 
specifically pleaded. On the contrary, all the evidence 
shows that appellants were fully apprised concerning the 
case and its ramifications at the trial. This complaint is 
therefore without merit. 
The burden of appellants' argument that the facts 
do not show the existence of a confidential relation is to 
the effect that neither Hazel nor Eugene had confidence 
in respondent. Respondent wishes to point out that this 
argument is immaterial, for it was the confidence re-
spondent had in Hazel and Eugene Child that was 
breached. It is sufficient that the confidence goes from 
the one•who trusts to the ones who breach; it is not re-
quired that those who breach have confidence also in the 
one who trusts. 
Respondent states in his testimony that he had con-
fidence in Hazel (Tr. 15), for he said that he did not 
think she would deliver to him any different sum from that 
he requested. He accepted and relied fully upon her 
representations that Eugene would grant the loan on 
condition that Eugene have record title as security. On 
her representations, respondent was induced to part with 
record title; and this alone is sufficient to show respondent's 
trust and confidence in his wife and son. That Hazel in 
turn had confidence in him is shown by the fact that she 
delivered over the money upon his oral promise to deed 
to Eugene as security. 
That respondent had confidence in Eugene is shown 
by evidence that he loaned Eugene and Brandt $1200.00 
without security and after the transaction here in ques-
tion (Tr. 28, 31, 103, 104), as well as by the fact that he 
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willingly conveyed title to Eugene for security as he 
promised to do. As noted above, Hazel's testimony that 
Eugen~ told her before leaving for the Navy not to loan 
any of his money to his father (Tr. 38) is shown to be 
most highly improbable by the stipulated evidence (R. 21) 
showing that at the time Eugene had only about $8.45 in 
the joint account with his mother. Also, Eugene himself 
testified that he and his father were on good terms in 1945 
(Tr. 98), and that he and his father trust one another 
(Tr. 104). 
This Court, in Perry v. McConkJe (1953), I U.2d 
189, 264 P.2d 852, 854, states that where a fiduciary re-
lationship exists, because of the kinship of the parties, the 
fiduciary has the burden of proving that his dealings with 
the beneficiary are fair and in good faith. In that case, 
there appears to be far less evidence of confidence placed 
by the sister in her brothers than there is evidence of mis-
placed confidence in the present case. This Court also 
found confidential family relationships in Anderson v. 
Cercone (1919), 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586; Haws v. Jensen 
(1949), 116 U. 212, 209 P.2d 229; and Hawkins v. Perry 
(1953), 123 U. 16, 253 P.2d 372. 
POINT V 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 6 AND NO. 7 ARE 
WITHIN THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants complain that Conclusions of Law No. 6 
and No. 7 are not within the issues of the case and are 
contrary to the evidence. Their argument states that the 
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subject-matter of these conclusions (unjust enrichment 
and constructive fraud) is not expressly mentioned in the 
complaint, and their sole comment about the evidence 
relative to these matters is confined to unjust enrichment. 
The allegations of the complaint are in essence that 
respondent borrowed money from Eugene Child through 
his mother, Hazel Child, to purchase certain property; 
that he purchased this property and thereafter placed 
title thereto in the name of Eugene as security; that re-
spondent received the money only as a loan; that respondent 
did not intend to part with beneficial ownership of the 
land; that all parties to the transaction intended the deed 
to be a mortgage; in the alternative that Eugene Child, 
knowing the mind and intentions of respondent, did not 
intend to hold the property for the benefit of respondent 
and return title to him; and that appellants wrongfully 
refused to reconvey to respondent upon demand and offer 
of repayment. These allegations adequately present the 
factual situation which was the basis of the action and 
sufficiently raise as issues the relationship of the various 
persons named and their actions with respect to the trans-
action, as well as the question whether or not Eugene 
lawfully held the property in question. The actions of 
the parties being in issue, their constructively fraudulent 
actions must necessarily be also. The issue whether or 
not Eugene lawfully held the property certainly included 
reasons at law why he did not lawfully so hold, including 
unjust enrichment. 
There is no complaint or showing by appellants that 
they were misled in any way by the complaint. On the 
contrary, a reading of the transcript shows that both 
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sides were fully apprised of the situation giving rise to the 
action; and it affirmatively appears in the transcript that 
appellants took the deposition of respondent prior to 
the trial, at which time they of course had full opportunity 
to explore and develop respondent's facts. The record 
is devoid of a motion for a more definite statement; there-
fore it is plain that appellants did not need one, being fully 
apprised. 
Rebutting appellants' comments on the evidence rela-
tive to unjust enrichment, the Restatement of Restitution, 
Sec. 160, comment d, points out that restitution is made 
in such cases to u ••• restore to the plaintiff property of 
which he has been unjustly deprived and to take from the 
defendant property the retention of which by him would 
result in a corresponding unjust enrichment of the de-
fendant; in other words the effect is to prevent a loss to 
the plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defendant, 
and to put each of them in the position in which he was 
before the defendant acquired the property." Appel-
lanes do not deny that it was respondent who wanted to 
buy the property, sought out the owner, investigated its 
value, negotiated for its purchase over a period of four 
years, and finally purchased it; who built with his own 
labor and paid for a substantial fence around the property; 
who has continuously and without objection used and oc-
cupied the property ever since he bought it; and who has 
continuously and without exception claimed the property 
as his own ever since. -
Respondent testified, and the trial court found, that 
he delayed his application to the courts for redress in an 
unsuccessful attempt to preserve his family unity and 
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harmony. But he immediately applied to the courts when 
his family was disrupted by divorce at the instance of his 
wife, Hazel, and when he learned of acts by Eugene Child 
derogatory to respondent's beneficial ownership of the 
property (Tr. 116, 117). He patiently tried for all the 
intervening years to talk to Eugene, hoping to persuade 
him to reconvey the property amicably, but Eugene re-
fused to talk with him about it. Throughout, respondent's 
interest has been to develop a dairy herd for the benefit 
of the family. 
In contrast, what of Eugene? Eugene Child had no 
interest in nor knowledge of the property or its value. He 
did not search out the owner and try to buy it. He did not 
negotiate for its purchase. His sole contact therewith was 
his response to his father's application to him for a loan. 
He knew no reason at the trial why his father should give 
him any preference to the property over the other chil-
dren in the family. He did not develop the property, 
nor use it except to commit waste by removal of soil. He 
simply returned home from the service and found him-
self, because of the wrong either of Hazel alone or of 
Hazel and Eugene jointly, the record owner of a large 
tract of land. It is safe to conclude that Eugene's de-
termination not to reconvey was in direct proportion to 
the rising value of the property. The lower court properly 
concluded that Eugene would be unjustly enriched were 
he allowed to retain the property. 
POINT VI 
RESPONDENT'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR BY 
LACHES. 
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Appellants invoke the doctrine of laches, and in an-
swer thereto respondent invites the attention of the court 
to the fact that respondent has been in possession of the 
property in question, enjoying the full beneficial use there-
of, ever since he purchased it. It was established at the 
trial that record title to realty in the Child family fre-
quently reposed in another than the true owner. Spe-
cifically, title to property ((B" was in respondent's sister 
Martha for many years as security for a loan, and then 
(through Hazel's alteration of a deed) went to Hazel, re-
spondent's wife, even though respondent purchased and 
actually owned said property. As long as respondent had 
the possession and beneficial use of property ((A," and 
while he still had hopes of maintaining family unity and 
harmony, he cannot be said to have been under an equit-
able obligation to throw the fat into the fire by instigating 
litigation against his son. It most surely cannot be said 
to be the policy of the law in such a situation to avoid 
patient attempts at peaceful persuasion and to stir up 
intra-family strife by requiring a precipitate lawsuit. 
Surely equity will look with sympathy upon respondent's 
earnest and patient efforts to accomplish justice within 
his family in peace and harmony and without recourse 
except as a last alternative to the shame and disruption of 
a public trial at law. The transcript and findings show 
that respondent delayed pursuing his remedy at law be-
cause: he was in peaceful and beneficial possession of the 
property; he had hopes that eventually Eugene would 
discuss the question with him and be persuaded to recon-
vey to the true owner; respondent and Eugene were in the 
confidential relationship of father and son, with respondent 
loaning Eugene and his brother money (Tr. 28) without 
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security and conveying land from property uB" to Eu-
gene for his residence without charge (Tr. 29, 30, 43); 
and he did not want to destroy his family by the open 
conflict of a lawsuit (Tr. 34, 35). This is sufficient justi-
fication for the delay in bringing this suit. 
Unreasonable delay alone, moreover, is not sufficient 
reason for finding laches. Restatement of Restitution, 
Sec. 148 and comments. There must also be such a mate-
rial and innocent change of position by the other party 
that restitution would work injustice or an inequitable 
hardship upon him. In the present case, appellants knew 
ever since Eugene returned from the service in 1946 that 
respondent claimed ownership of the property; thus any 
change of position by appellants was not innocent. Further, 
appellants have made no showing of any kind of any 
detrimental reliance upon respondent's delay. Appellants 
show no damage, no hardship, no assumption of ris~ or 
responsibility with respect to the property. They fail to 
show in any regard wherein the present judgment against 
them is a greater disadvantage or hardship than the same 
judgment would have been five or ten years ago. Absent 
such a showing, a court cannot properly apply the doctrine 
of laches. 
Appellants' comments relative to risk, responsibility, 
and fruition of faith, against the background of the pres-
ent situation, go beyond the point of argument and as-
sume proportions of the ludicrous. Appellants cannot 
point to a single element of risk, responsibility, or faith 
on the part of Eugene relative to this property, save, per-
haps, for the payment of less than $20.00 per year in 
taxes. (That payment of taxes are not controlling, see 
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Christensen v. Williams (1908), 34 U. 127, 97 P. 219.) 
The only faith and responsibility exercised as to this 
property have been respondent's-and undeniably his has 
been all the risk, with record title in another. Relative to 
appellants' argument as to change in value of the property, 
it is interesting to note that the tax records in evidence 
show that the valuation for tax purposes, and presumably 
market value, did not rise until 1955 or 1956. 
As to laches, as said by the court in Berniker v. Bern-
iker (1947), 30 Cal.2d 439, 182 P.2d 557, 563, 
((Nor is the defense of laches available here, for 
it is plain that no legal prejudice was caused to ap-
pellant by reason of the delay in making a demand 
nor by reason of the nonenforcement of the trust . 
. . . Moreover, the facts and circumstances of this 
case suggest other grounds for the rejection of 
the doctrine of laches: It is not applied strictly 
between near relatives ... it is of little significance 
in the case of a resulting trust ... and ((it) is not 
designed to punish a plaintiff' but is (invoked where 
a refusal would be to permit an unwarranted in-
justice.' ... (it is never permitted to be invoked 
merely to aid a faithless trustee in consummating 
his wrong.':)' 
As to appellants' contentions relative to the statute 
of limitations, it does not appear that the Davidson case, 
cited by appellants on p. 41 of their brief, is in point, for 
the respondent here is in possession of the property. Re-
spondent points to the evidence and findings that re-
spondent enjoyed full possession and use of the property 
from the time he purchased it until the time of the suit. 
In the Berniker case, cited above, the court said on this 
point, p. 563, Pacific: 
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u ••• The statute of limitations never runs in 
favor of a trustee as against the beneficiary while the 
latter is in possession of the property. (citing 
cases)" 
Also in this regard see Anderson v. Cercone (1919), 54 U. 
345, 180 P. 586, where this Court expressly states that 
joint possession by the beneficiary of such a trust tolls the 
statute of limitations by the express terms thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is wholly sufficient to sustain the judg-
ment of the trial court. The evidence alone that the 
property in question was purchased in the first instance 
by respondent is sufficient to sustain the judgment under 
Christensen v. Williams (1908), 34 U. 127, 97 P. 219, 
cited above. 
To deprive respondent in his old age of the benefits 
of his initiative and judgment in purchasing the property 
after prolonged interest therein would be a most grave 
miscarriage of justice. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODRUFF C. GWYNN and 
CHILD & SPAFFORD 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attortteys for Respondent 
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